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Abstract
Previous studies show that close friends improve at lie detection over time. However, is this improvement due to an increase
in the ability to decode the feelings of close friends or a change in how close friends communicate their true and deceptive
emotions? In a study of 45 pairs of friends, one friend from each pair (the “sender”) was videotaped showing truthful and
faked affect in response to pleasant and unpleasant movie clips. The other friend from each pair (the “judge”) guessed the
true emotions of both the friend and a stranger 1 month and 6 months into the friendship. Judges were better at guessing
the true emotions of friends than strangers, and this advantage in judging friends increased among close friends over time.
Surprisingly, improvement over time was due mostly to a change in the sender’s communication, rather than an increase in
judges’ ability to decode their friends’ feelings.
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People are notoriously poor at detecting the deception of
strangers (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Whether this ability
improves within the context of close relationships is less
clear. Although we might expect that accuracy would be
higher between people who know each other well, surprisingly there is no unqualified support for the notion that
friends or romantic partners detect each other’s lies better
than strangers can (Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1999;
Ickes & Simpson, 1997; McCornack & Levine, 1990;
McCornack & Parks, 1986; Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004).

Why Friends Might Not Be Superior to
Strangers at Detecting Deception
Ironically, knowing someone well may actually impair our
deception detection ability by imparting a false sense of confidence in the ability to read that particular person.
McCornack and Parks (1986) theorized that being in a close
relationship leads to increased truth bias (the tendency to
judge most communications as truthful), which in turn leads
to diminished deception detection accuracy. Although this
theory has not been tested in friendships, it was supported in
a study of romantic couples in which increased confidence in
one’s ability to “read” one’s relationship partner led to greater
truth bias and lower deception detection accuracy (Levine &
McCornack, 1992).

Perhaps one of the most important obstacles to detecting the
lies of friends is that those are exactly the types of lies people
most want to believe. While people typically tell strangers selfcentered lies to make themselves look good, 44% of lies told to
friends are altruistic lies told to protect them from negative feelings or make them feel good. Another 19% of lies told to friends
are told to avoid conflict and maintain the friendship (DePaulo
& Kashy, 1998). These are the types of lies that are in people’s
best interest and in the best interest of their friendship to accept
as true. Murray and colleagues (Murray & Holmes, 1999;
Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996) have shown that positive illusions can contribute to stability and satisfaction in romantic
relationships and it is likely that the same is true of friendships.
Ickes and Simpson (1997) developed a model to predict when close relationship partners should be motivated
(consciously or unconsciously) not to read each other’s
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affective states accurately. They theorized that motivated
inaccuracy is most prone to occur when the perceiver’s
close relationship partner experiences thoughts and feelings that are threatening to the perceiver or to the relationship, and when the partner’s verbal and nonverbal
cues are ambiguous. In this model, the main cause of
motivated inaccuracy is the perceiver’s own feelings. In a
study by Anderson (1999), people attempted to detect
deception when their romantic partner and a stranger
stated honestly or deceptively that they found another
person attractive. Romantic partners were less accurate
than strangers and had a stronger truth bias, particularly
when the hidden truth was threatening to their relationships—that is, when their partners pretended that they did
not find someone else attractive.
An alternative possibility is that threatening cues become
ambiguous to a close relationship partner precisely because
the person expressing those cues wants them to be. In one of
the earliest studies on motivated inaccuracy, Rosenthal and
DePaulo (1979) showed that women are more likely than men
to perform poorly at interpreting nonverbal cues that senders
are trying to hide. They theorized that perceivers who read
cues that senders deliberately try to disguise may be committing a particularly destructive violation of polite behavior—
perceiving the emotions people would like to disguise—and
that women are more concerned about this violation than are
men. There is evidence that close friends in particular have a
need to respect each other’s emotional privacy by not detecting unpleasant emotional truths that are hidden. Sternglanz
and DePaulo (2004) found that close friends were worse than
less close friends at reading unpleasant emotions but only
when those unpleasant emotions were intended to be hidden.
Interestingly, the hidden information that close friends failed
to detect in that study was not even threatening to the relationship. While past researchers of empathic accuracy have
argued that friends should be accurate at recognizing emotions that are nonthreatening to the relationship, most of those
studies have not explicitly explored deception detection,
which is a more challenging form of empathic accuracy
because the senders are intentionally concealing their true
emotions. Therefore, it may be the case that motivated inaccuracy in deception detection can occur with very little motivation; the conscious or unconscious respect for a friend’s
emotional privacy may be sufficient.

When and Why Friends Might Be
Superior to Strangers at Detecting
Deception
Intuitively, we would expect that friends should be better
at discerning information about each others’ thoughts,
feelings, and traits than strangers—and this is generally
the case (Stinson & Ickes, 1992). Friends show superior
accuracy in understanding each other’s personality traits,
as compared with strangers (Funder & Colvin, 1988;

Paulhus & Bruce, 1992), and friends’ advantage in this
domain is not merely based on assumed similarity (Funder,
Kolar, & Blackman, 1995). Friends are also better than
strangers at decoding each other’s thoughts and feelings
(e.g., Ansfield, DePaulo, & Bell, 1995; Thomas & Fletcher,
2003).
Friends may also be more accurate in detecting deception
than strangers due to the advantages of familiarity. Friends’
experiences with each other allow them to read the subtext
of each other’s communications intuitively and automatically (Colvin, Vogt, & Ickes, 1997). People often spot lies
by targeting behaviors or phrases that seem different from
the norm (Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1982). Because
friends know each other’s baseline behaviors and manner of
speech, deviations from those baseline norms may enable
friends to detect behavioral anomalies with superior accuracy. Indeed, people believe that their friends are more likely
to detect their lies than are acquaintances (DePaulo &
Kashy, 1998).
Friends who feel particularly close to each other might
have an advantage in detecting deception over friends who
feel less close to each other. In a daily diary study of everyday lies, DePaulo and Kashy (1998) included measures of
self-reported relationship closeness, how long participants
had known the relationship partner, and how frequently participants interacted with the relationship partner. Only relationship closeness was correlated with the likelihood that the
lies were eventually discovered. Thus, it appears likely that
emotional closeness, rather than merely spending time
together, is the key component in successful lie detection.
This is exactly what Anderson, DePaulo, and Ansfield (2002)
found in their study of friends’ ability to detect deception at
two points in time; only the close friends became more accurate over time.

Can Friends Detect Lies Indirectly?
Whether or not friends are better than strangers at detecting
deception, it is possible that friends can indirectly sense when
their friends are lying even if they cannot quite make the correct judgment call. Although the accuracy of judges is typically only slightly better than chance when they are asked to
decide whether a sender is lying or being truthful, certain
studies have shown that judges can detect deception indirectly even when their explicit choices are inaccurate (see
DePaulo & Morris, 2004, for a review). For example, when
judges rate a sender who is lying, they perceive that sender as
being more ambivalent, less comfortable, and exhibiting
more cognitive effort than a sender who is being truthful
(DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green, & Rosenkrantz, 1982; Hurd &
Noller, 1988; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). Furthermore,
judges feel more suspicious, less comfortable, and less confident when they are watching someone who is lying rather
than being truthful (Anderson, 1999; Anderson et al., 2002;
DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997).
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Judges’ ratings of these indirect variables are correlated with
whether the sender is lying, even when the judges make inaccurate guesses as to whether the sender is lying or being truthful (ten Brinke, Stimson, & Carney, 2014). While the existence
of various indirect cues to deception has been found across
many studies, there is debate as to whether indirect cues are
actually more accurate than explicit cues (see Levine & Bond,
2014).
Notably, most explicit and indirect deception detection
studies take place with strangers or brief acquaintances,
rather than close relationship partners. In the few deception
detection studies with relationship partners, the pattern of
indirect lie detection was stronger among friends (Anderson
et al., 2002) and romantic partners (Anderson et al., 1999)
than among strangers. Therefore, the question of whether
friends are more accurate than strangers in detecting deception should explore both explicit and indirect measures of
deception detection.

The Importance of the Sender in Close
Friends’ Deception Detection Accuracy
Most studies of deception detection focus on the role of the
“judge,” the person who is judging whether someone else is
behaving truthfully or deceptively, rather than the “sender,”
the person sending verbal and nonverbal cues while being
truthful or deceptive (Levine, 2010). This focus on the judge
is understandable given that judges’ decisions are the markers used to gauge accuracy. However, it is possible that
judges are accurate not because of their own deception detection skills but because the senders are behaving in a way that
makes them especially readable to the judge. In studies
examining accuracy in guessing people’s emotions when no
deception is involved, interpersonal sensitivity is related
more to the sender’s expressivity than to the judge’s perceptivity (Snodgrass, Hecht, & Ploutz-Snyder, 1998). Although
one would expect that judges who are high in trait empathy
would demonstrate more empathic accuracy, empathy only
improves accuracy when the target is highly expressive
(Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008).
Examining both the role of the judge’s capabilities to
detect deception and the sender’s abilities to deceive is particularly important in the context of friendships. When
friends are more accurate than strangers, is their decoding
advantage due to the fact that the judges are particularly
knowledgeable about their friends’ normal behavior and
idiosyncrasies, or is their decoding advantage due to the fact
that the senders express emotions that are specifically readable to their friends? In other words, is friends’ decoding
advantage due to superior judges or superior senders?
There is evidence for both possibilities. Buller and Aune
(1987) found that deceptive senders leaked differing amounts
of affect-related nonverbal cues to strangers than to friends or
romantic partners, indicating that senders’ behavior plays an
important role in deception among friends versus strangers.

Fleming, Darley, Hilton, and Kojetin (1990) asked senders to
convey, via a videotaped message, which of four songs the
judge should choose. They were told that the same video
would be shown to their close friends as well as strangers, and
their goal was to get their friends to pick the correct song
while the strangers pick the incorrect song. The strategy that
most of the senders spontaneously used was to insert falsified
personal information that only their friends would notice.
However, a small group of senders used nonverbal cues—
characteristic facial expressions which would be recognized
only by their friends due to the past usage of those expression
within the friendship. Close friends were able to detect these
subtle hints and decode the senders’ true meaning while
strangers could not. Thus, senders can communicate lies that
are unseen by strangers but visible to friends (Fleming et al.,
1990) when their intention is to convey the truth only to their
friends.
Some have argued, though, that it is the judges’ knowledge about their friends that causes them to be more accurate
than strangers who lack that knowledge (Ickes & Simpson,
1997; Stinson & Ickes, 1992). However, most studies showing that friends are more accurate than strangers at judging a
sender’s true thoughts and feelings are based upon videotapes of the senders made at a single point in time. These
types of studies cannot rule out the possibility that the sender
has already become more readable to the friend over the
course of the friendship prior to the study, and that this
increased readability is responsible for the higher accuracy
between friends.
To answer the question of whether the advantage in deception detection accuracy of friends over strangers is due to the
judge or the sender, a longitudinal study of newly developing
friendships is necessary. The best time to explore this question is as the relationship is first developing to see who is
becoming more accurate or more readable over time.
Anderson et al. (2002) found that emotionally close friends
improve at detecting each other’s lies during the first 6
months of friendship. However, their study was not designed
to test whether the judge or the sender was driving that
improved accuracy. The current study directly tested whether
the improved accuracy is due to an improvement in the ability of the judges or whether the senders communicate their
truths and lies differently as their friendship develops over
time.

Research Questions
In the present research, we recruited 45 pairs of same-sex
friends who had known each other for no more than 1 month,
but who still considered themselves “friends.” One friend
from each pair was randomly assigned the role of “sender”;
each sender was videotaped expressing both truthful and
faked emotional responses to pleasant and unpleasant video
clips. For half of these emotional displays, senders were told
that the intended audience was their friend while the other
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half were intended for a stranger. The other friend from each
pair was assigned as “judge” and watched a video of the
senders’ emotional responses, attempted to detect whether
senders’ emotional responses were truthful or faked, and
attempted to guess whether the video clips senders watched
were pleasant or unpleasant. Judges also completed two
potential indirect measures of deception detection, including
ratings of senders’ expressivity and intensity. Each judge
watched eight videos of his or her friend and eight videos of
a same-sex stranger. This procedure occurred at Time 1 (1
month into the friendship) and Time 2 (6 months into the
friendship). In addition, judges at Time 2 rejudged the senders’ videos from Time 1; this was called the Re-do condition.
Using this procedure, we were able to address the following
five research questions:
Research Question 1: Do friends differ from strangers in
their ability to detect each other’s lies and accurately read
each other’s true emotions?
Although it may seem intuitive that friends would be superior to strangers on these tasks, past studies do not provide
unqualified evidence that this is the case (Anderson et al.,
1999; Ickes & Simpson, 1997; McCornack & Levine, 1990;
McCornack & Parks, 1986; Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004).
Research Question 2: Do close friends become more
accurate judging their friends over time than they do judging strangers?
To test whether improvement over time is actually due to the
friendship rather than just being due to judging the same person twice, the key dependent variable will be a difference
score representing the advantage in judging friends more
accurately than strangers. Based on the results of Anderson
et al. (2002), we anticipated that only close friends, but not
less close friends, would show a greater advantage in judging
their friends more accurately than strangers over time.
Research Question 3: If close friends show a greater
advantage in judging friends more accurately than strangers over time, is this due to an improvement in judges’
ability to decode the feelings of close friends or improved
sender readability within close friendships?
If, as shown by Anderson et al. (2002), judges are more accurate at decoding their close friends at Time 2 (6 months into
the friendship) than at Time 1 (1 month into the friendship),
this could mean either that judges were improving or that
senders were becoming more readable to their close friends.
Intuitively, one might attribute such improvements to the
judges; however, the potential role of the sender should not
be overlooked (Levine, 2010; Levine et al., 2011).
Our experimental design was intended to tease apart the
roles of the senders versus the judges in any improvements

over time. To test whether the improvement is driven by the
judge, the sender, or both, we also asked judges to rejudge
the senders’ clips from Time 1 at Time 2 (called the Re-do
condition). If judges were more accurate at judging senders
in the Re-do condition than at Time 1, this would indicate
that the improvements were due to changes in judges’ aptitude over time (because the sender clips are identical in these
two conditions). On the contrary, if judges were more accurate at Time 2 than in the Re-do condition, this would indicate that senders’ encoding ability has improved over time
(because the judges made both of these judgments at Time
2). It should be noted that these two possibilities are not
mutually exclusive. A third possibility is that accuracy was
greatest at Time 2, followed by the Re-do condition, which in
turn had greater accuracy than Time 1; this would indicate
improvements over time in both judges’ aptitude and senders’ encoding.
Research Question 4: Will friends show evidence of
motivated inaccuracy when their friends are hiding
unpleasant emotion from them?
Consistent with the findings of Sternglanz and DePaulo
(2004) and the concept of motivated inaccuracy presented by
Ickes and Simpson (1997), we predicted that friends would
do particularly poorly detecting the unpleasant emotions of
their friends specifically when their friends were attempting
to disguise those unpleasant emotions by feigning pleasant
emotions.
Research Question 5: Can senders’ deceptive and truthful emotions be distinguished by judges’ responses to
indirect measures? If so, does this ability differ for friends
versus strangers?
Previous research (see Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo, 1994;
DePaulo & Morris, 2004) indicates that people can often distinguish between truthful and deceptive communications on
indirect or implicit measures, sometimes even when they
cannot do so explicitly. Because the judges in this study rated
facial expressions, we chose indirect measures appropriate
for nonverbal communication. We examined whether judges
could detect deception indirectly by asking judges to rate
senders’ expressivity and intensity across all conditions. We
also compared these two indirect measures of deception
detection for friends versus strangers.

Method
Participants
Experimenters contacted students enrolled in an introductory
psychology course within 2 weeks after the beginning of the
semester at a university in the Southeastern United States.
Students were told that they would be eligible to participate
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in the study if they and a same-sex friend whom they had not
known before the beginning of the semester completed separate applications for the study. Pairs in which each person
indicated on the application forms that they were indeed
friends and had known each other for less than a month were
invited to participate in the study. The first session was
scheduled approximately a month into their friendship, and a
second session was scheduled 5 months later. A total of 45
pairs (19 male pairs and 26 female pairs) completed both sessions. The sample included 71 Caucasians, six African
Americans, five Asians, two Latinos, three biracial participants, and three who did not provide ethnic information.
At the beginning of each of the two sessions, each friend
completed the Subjective Closeness Index for the friendship
(see Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). This index included two
questions: “Relative to all of your other relationships, how
would you characterize your relationship with this person?”
and “Relative to what you know about other people’s close
relationships, how would you characterize your relationship
to this person?” Answers ranged from 1 (much less close
than others) to 9 (much closer than others). Friendships were
classified as close if both friends gave a mean response on
these questions of 6 or greater during both the first and second sessions; thus, friends were considered close if they both
felt close to each other 1 month into the friendship and
remained close 5 months later. Twenty-five pairs of friends
were classified as close and 20 pairs as not especially close.
The mean closeness ratings for the close friends were 6.81
and 7.10 at 1 month and 6 months, respectively; the mean
closeness ratings for the less close friends were 5.38 and 4.50
at 1 month and 6 months, respectively. At the same time,
when participants rated how close they felt to their friend,
they also rated their amount of self-disclosure in that friendship, as measured by how many topics they discussed with
their friends (answers ranged from 0 to 18 topics, and the
topics included movies, personal crises, clothes, dating, family conflict, sex life, grades, etc.). The relational self-disclosure measure was used to confirm the closeness
categorizations. A three-way ANOVA (Relationship
Closeness × Dyad Gender × Time) found that the close
friendships included more self-disclosure (M = 10.60) than
the less close friendships (M = 7.41), F(1, 41) = 16.01, p <
.001 (self-disclosure was averaged between the two friends).
This difference in self-disclosure between close and less
close friends was equally true of men and women and did not
change significantly from 1 month to 6 months into the
friendship.

Design
This repeated-measures study utilized a seven-way mixed
design. The two between-participant variables included the
closeness of the friendships (close vs. less close) and the sex
of the same-sex pairs (male vs. female). The five within-participant independent variables included the type of movie

clips the judges watched (pleasant vs. unpleasant), the
instructions senders were given (show their true emotional
reactions to the clips vs. fake the opposite reaction), whom
the senders were instructed to convey expressions to (their
friend vs. a stranger), whose facial reactions the judges rated
(their friend vs. a stranger), and which time the ratings were
made (Session 1, Session 2, or the rerating of Session 1 facial
expressions completed during Session 2 which was called
the Re-do condition). The statistical power of this design was
enhanced due to the many within-participant variables. Each
participant provided data in every condition of the study.
Because most statistical comparisons were made within individuals as opposed to between individuals (with the exception of relationship closeness and gender), individual
differences between participants were removed as a source
of variability. For this reason, effect sizes and power tend to
be higher in within-participant designs than between-participant designs, even with fewer participants (Aron, Coups, &
Aron, 2013).
Dependent variables included direct and indirect measures of the judges’ accuracy in detecting the senders’ truths
and lies. The direct measures included the judges’ guesses
about whether the senders were showing their true emotion
or the opposite, whether the senders were actually watching
a pleasant or unpleasant movie clip, ratings of how genuine
the senders’ facial reactions were, and ratings of how pleasant the sender was feeling. These ratings were considered
“direct” because they explicitly required that participants
make guesses about the independent variables manipulated
in the experiment (whether the senders were being genuine
and whether they were responding to pleasant or unpleasant
stimuli). Indirect measures included judges’ ratings of how
intense the senders were feeling and how expressive the
senders’ facial reactions were. These two ratings were considered potential “indirect” measures of deception because it
is possible that the judges’ intensity or expressivity ratings
could reliably distinguish between senders’ truthful versus
deceptive communications despite the fact that the items did
not explicitly ask participants about deception.

Materials and Procedure
Film clips. Each pair of friends watched a set of eight film
clips during each session. These clips were selected from
among approximately 50 clips pretested by students from an
introductory social psychology class. The clips were pretested for the primary emotional reaction elicited by the clip,
as well as the extent to which the clip was humorous, sad,
distressing, pleasant, or disgusting. The 24 clips that had the
highest ratings for pleasantness/humor or the highest ratings
for unpleasantness/sadness, without any gender differences
in the pretested sample, were included in the pool of clips for
this study. Pleasant clips included funny scenes from comedic films (e.g., When Harry Met Sally) and television programs such as Saturday Night Live. Unpleasant clips depicted

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com by guest on January 20, 2016

209

Morris et al.
traumatic events such as someone dying from cancer, a couple fighting, parents finding a child dead, and someone saying goodbye to loved ones. Three sets of eight clips were
created (four pleasant and four unpleasant clips in each set
presented in a counterbalanced order). Each dyad watched
one of the sets of clips during Session 1 and a different set
during Session 2. Ratings of the video clips from Session 1
were used as a manipulation check of the pleasantness of the
clips. A within-participant t test confirmed that the pleasant
clips were indeed rated as being substantially more pleasant
than the unpleasant clips (M = 6.24 vs. M = 2.01, respectively, on a 0-8 scale), t(88) = 20.73, p < .001.
First session. Before the first session, one friend from each
pair was randomly assigned to the role of judge and the other
friend was assigned to the role of sender. While the judge
was out of the room, the sender was given an instruction
sheet describing how to respond while watching the eight
movie clips (four amusing/pleasant clips and four sad/
unpleasant clips). The senders were instructed to show how
they felt during half of the clips and to show the opposite of
how they felt during the other clips (to “fool” the person who
would be watching the videotape of them). In addition, senders were given instructions about the target audience for their
emotional expressions. Senders were instructed to convey
how they felt (or the opposite) to their friend or to a stranger.
The order of these instructions was counterbalanced across
the eight clips. Senders were aware that they would be videotaped while watching the movie clips.
The experimenter then brought the judge into the room
and placed a 6-foot high partition between the participants so
that they could not see each other’s facial expressions while
viewing the movie clips. The two friends were instructed not
to talk while watching the clips and the judge listened to the
movie clips using noise-canceling headphones so that any
noises (e.g., laughter) from the sender would not be heard.
While they watched the movie clips, both the sender and the
judge rated on 0- to 8-point scales their true emotional reactions to the clips (pleasant, intense, amused, distressed, and
sad). The experimenter went to a video control room and
recorded the sender as he or she watched the eight clips. The
experimenter only taped the sender while each movie clip
was running and covered the video camera lens between
clips.
Upon completion of this portion of the study, the participants were informed that they would view the videotape
made of the sender’s facial expressions as well as a tape of a
sender they did not know from another pair of friends
(referred to as the “yoked” pair of strangers). The order of
whom they watched first was counterbalanced. Because the
judges had already watched the same movie clips as their
friends in the same order, the experimenter began by showing the third facial expression segment through the eighth
segment and then showed the first two segments at the end.
The judges were only told that the persons they were viewing
would be showing their true responses to the clips some of

the time and opposite emotions at other times; they were not
told that exactly half of the expressions would be faked.
As the judge and sender watched the videotapes of facial
expressions, they were given a facial ratings booklet. The
dependent variables measured in this booklet included four
direct measures of accuracy—two dichotomous and two
continuous. Participants were asked to guess whether the
senders were watching a pleasant or unpleasant movie clip
and guess whether the senders were trying to show what
they were feeling or the opposite of what they were feeling
during each clip. Correct guesses were coded as 1, and
incorrect guesses were coded as 0. Therefore, means on
these dichotomous variables ranged from 0 to 1 and can be
interpreted as the percentage of guesses senders made correctly (50% is considered as accurate as chance).1 Accuracy
was also measured using continuous 9-point scales along
which participants rated how pleasant the senders’ feelings
were and how genuine/sincere the senders’ facial reactions
were. The booklet also included two dependent variables
that did not measure accuracy but were included as potential
indirect measures of lie detection. Along 9-point scales, participants rated how intense the senders’ feelings were and
how expressive the senders’ facial expressions were. The
facial ratings booklet included ratings for the above six
dependent variables in response to watching each of the
eight facial expressions of the friend sender and the eight
facial expressions of the sender from the yoked pair.
Although both the judges and the senders completed the
facial ratings booklet, the focus of this article was the judges’
ratings of the senders rather than the senders’ ratings of
themselves. The senders’ ratings of themselves were not
included in the data analysis.
Second session. Approximately 5 months later, each pair of
friends returned for their second session. The friends maintained their previously assigned roles of sender and judge,
and they were yoked with the same pair they had seen on
tape during the first session. The same procedure from the
first session was followed; once again, the sender was videotaped watching a different selection of eight movie clips, and
then the judge and sender used the facial ratings booklet to
rate the sender’s expressions as well as the videotapes of the
sender from the yoked pair. Again, because the judge had
watched the same movie clips as his or her friend, the experimenter began by showing the third facial expression segment
through the eighth segment and then showed the first two
segments at the end.
In addition to creating and rating the new videotapes of
the senders’ facial expressions filmed during the second session, the participants also rewatched and rerated the original
videotapes of both senders’ facial expressions from the first
session. Instead of viewing the videotapes in the same order
as they were viewed during the first session (beginning with
the third segment), this time participants began with the first
segment and watched them in the order in which they were
originally filmed.
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Table 1. Accuracy of Perceived Genuineness and Perceived Pleasantness When Judging Friends Versus Strangers.
Truth

Ratings of genuineness
Judging friend
Judging stranger

Lie

M

95% CI

M

95% CI

Difference

95% CI

5.59
4.79

[5.30, 5.89]
[4.55, 5.03]

4.40
5.08

[4.06, 4.75]
[4.76, 5.39]

1.19**
−0.29*

[0.83, 1.55]
[−0.53, −0.04]

Pleasant clip

Ratings of pleasantness
Judging friend
Judging stranger

Accuracy

Unpleasant clip

M

95% CI

M

95% CI

5.45
5.12

[5.22, 5.68]
[4.96, 5.27]

4.77
5.05

[4.56, 4.98]
[4.83, 5.27]

Accuracy
Difference
0.68**
0.06

95% CI
[0.36, 1.00]
[−0.20, 0.33]

Note. Higher difference scores indicate greater accuracy, and negative difference scores indicate inaccuracy. CI = confidence interval.
*p < .05. **p < .001.

Results
Overview of Analysis
The six dependent variables included the dichotomous and
continuous measures of lie detection/genuineness, the
dichotomous and continuous measures of accuracy detecting
pleasant/unpleasant emotion, and the two potential indirect
cues of lie detection—expressivity and intensity. For each of
the six dependent variables, a separate seven-way repeatedmeasures ANOVA was conducted. These seven-way
repeated-measures ANOVAs included the following withinparticipant variables: type of movie clips the judges watched
(pleasant vs. unpleasant), the instructions senders were given
(show their true emotional reactions to the clips vs. fake the
opposite reaction), whom the senders were instructed to convey expressions to (their friend vs. a stranger), whose facial
reactions the judges rated (their friend vs. a stranger), and at
which time the ratings were made (Session 1, Session 2, or
the rerating of Session 1 facial expressions completed during
Session 2). The two between-participant variables were the
closeness of the friendships (close vs. less close) and the sex
of the same-sex pairs (male vs. female).

Higher Accuracy Judging Friends Than Strangers
On the dichotomous measure of accuracy in lie detection,
judges were more accurate at guessing whether senders were
showing or faking emotion when judging friends (M = 61%,
95% confidence interval [CI] = [57%, 65%]) than strangers
(M = 48%, 95% CI = [45%, 51%]), F(1, 41) = 33.96, p <
.001, η2 = .45. Similarly, on the continuous measure of perceived genuineness, judges thought their friend’s facial
expressions were more genuine when their friends were
being truthful rather than lying but they thought that the
stranger’s facial expression was more genuine when the
stranger was lying rather than being truthful, indicating a
pattern of accuracy for friends but inaccuracy for strangers,

F(1, 41) = 48.93, p < .001, η2 = .54 (see Table 1). For both the
dichotomous measure of accuracy in lie detection and the
continuous measure of perceived genuineness, the pattern
that judges were more accurate when judging friends than
strangers remained consistent regardless of whether the
senders were being truthful or lying.
Similarly, on the continuous measure of perceived pleasantness, judges were only significantly accurate when judging friends but not when judging strangers. When judging
friends, the judges thought the sender’s feelings were more
pleasant when the clip actually was pleasant than unpleasant,
F(1, 41) = 8.00, p = .007, η2 = .16 (see Table 1). Although
this pattern of accuracy for friends was greater when the
senders were being genuine, the accuracy for friends still
remained significant even when the friends were faking their
emotion, F(1, 41) = 41.80, p < .001, η2 = .51. On the dichotomous measure of accuracy in guessing emotion, judges were
also more accurate at guessing whether the movie clip was
pleasant or unpleasant when they were judging a friend (M =
62%, 95% CI = [58%, 65%]) than when judging a stranger
(M = 51%, 95% CI = [47%, 54%]), F(1, 41) = 14.89, p <
.001, η2 = .27. All four of the dependent variables measuring
accuracy showed that people were more accurate judging
their friends than strangers. While this pattern did not vary
depending upon whether the sender was being genuine or
deceptive for three of those four variables, it did vary on the
dichotomous measure of emotion detection. When it came to
guessing the senders’ actual emotions, judges were more
accurate judging the emotions of friends than strangers when
the senders were being truthful but not when the sender was
being deceptive, F(1, 41) = 15.77, p < .001, η2 = .28.
There was some evidence of motivated inaccuracy when
judges attempted to guess their friend’s disguised unpleasant
emotions. When the senders were displaying their true emotions, judges were consistently more accurate guessing the
emotions of their friends than strangers. However, when the
senders were faking their emotions, the advantage in judging
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Figure 1. The advantage in judging friends more accurately than strangers as a function of the pleasantness of the clip and whether the
sender is showing or hiding emotion.
Note. The bars represent the mean difference score in percent accuracy for friends minus strangers. Higher bars indicate greater accuracy in judging
friends than strangers.
*These difference scores are significantly different from zero.

friends more accurately than strangers was no longer significant, and the most dramatic decrease occurred when the
senders were disguising unpleasant emotions, F(1, 41) =
5.96, p = .019, η2 = .13 (see Figure 1). Interestingly, judges
became even less accurate judging their friends than strangers when the senders were trying to disguise their unpleasant
emotions (although this difference was not statistically
significant).

The Advantage in Judging Friends More
Accurately Than Strangers Increases Over Time
Among Close Friends
For close friends, the advantage in judging friends more
accurately than strangers on the dichotomous measure of lie
detection was larger at Time 2 than at Time 1 or the Re-do.
However, for less close friends, the advantage in judging
friends more accurately than strangers decreased, and was
smaller at Time 2 than at Time 1 or the Re-do, F(2, 82) =
5.71, p = .005, η2 = .12. The same pattern was found for the
dichotomous measure of guessing emotion. The advantage in
guessing the emotions of friends more accurately than strangers was strongest for close friends at Time 2 but weakest for
less close friends at Time 2, F(2, 81) = 3.67, p = .03, η2 = .08.
Similarly, for close friends, the advantage in perceiving genuineness more accurately for friends than strangers was
greater at Time 2 than at Time 1 or the Re-do. For less close
friends, the advantage was smallest at Time 2, F(2, 82) =
3.74, p = .028, η2 = .08 (see Table 2).
Simple effects tests were conducted to determine what was
driving the changes over time. For the dichotomous measure

of lie detection, close friends became marginally significantly
more accurate judging their friends at Time 2 than at Time 1
(p = .09) or the Re-do (p = .09; and Time 1 and the Re-do did
not differ from each other). Close friends also became significantly less accurate judging strangers at Time 2 than at Time
1 (p = .045). For the dichotomous measure of guessing emotion, close friends became significantly more accurate judging their friends at Time 2 than at Time 1 (p = .024) or the
Re-do (p = .022; and Time 1 and the Re-do did not differ from
each other; see Table 2). For both of these dependent variables, the accuracy of less close friends did not change at all.

Ratings of Expressivity
Judges thought that senders appeared significantly less expressive at Time 2 (M = 5.24, 95% CI = [5.01, 5.48]) than at Time
1 (M = 5.68, 95% CI = [5.40, 5.96], p = .009), with the Re-do
falling in the middle (M = 5.46, 95% CI = [5.15, 5.77]), F(2,
82) = 4.02, p = .022, η2 = .09. The perception that the senders
became less expressive over time was held by friends and
strangers alike, regardless of relationship closeness.
When judges rated a stranger, they found the stranger to
be more expressive if the sender had been instructed to communicate to his or her friend (M = 5.58, 95% CI = [5.24,
5.90]) than to a stranger (M = 5.22, 95% CI = [4.85, 5.59],
p = .019). However, when judges rated their friend, they did
not perceive any significant differences in their friend’s
expressivity regardless of whether their friend was communicating to them (M = 5.49, 95% CI = [5.19, 5.79]) or to a
stranger (M = 5.55, 95% CI = [5.29, 5.82], p = .68), F(1, 41)
= 4.65, p = .037, η2 = .10.
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Table 2. Percent Accuracy of Close Friends and Less Close Friends at Time 1, the Re-Do, and Time 2.
Time 1

Accuracy detecting deception
Close friends
  Judging friend
  Judging stranger
   Advantage of friendship
Less close friends
  Judging friend
  Judging stranger
   Advantage of friendship
Accuracy judging emotion
Close friends
  Judging friend
  Judging stranger
   Advantage of friendship
Less close friends
  Judging friend
  Judging stranger
   Advantage of friendship

Re-do

Time 2

M

95% CI

M

95% CI

M

95% CI

56a
50c
6

[48, 64]
[42, 58]
[−4, 17]

56a
48cd
8

[47, 65]
[39, 56]
[−3, 21]

66b
38d
28

[58, 75]
[30, 47]
[17, 40]

64
48
16

[57, 71]
[41, 55]
[7, 25]

64
50
14

[56, 72]
[42, 57]
[4, 25]

60
55
5

[53, 68]
[47, 62]
[−5, 16]

57a
50
7

[48, 67]
[43, 57]
[−6, 20]

58a
51
7

[50, 67]
[42, 60]
[−5, 20]

72b
49
23

[64, 81]
[40, 58]
[11, 35]

61
49
12

[53, 69]
[43, 55]
[0, 24]

62
50
12

[54, 69]
[42, 58]
[0, 22]

58
56
2

[51, 66]
[48, 63]
[−8, 13]

Note. Means in the same row which have different subscript letters differ from each other. CI = confidence interval; Advantage of friendship = judge friend
minus judge stranger.

Ratings of Expressivity as an Indirect Measure of
Lie Detection Among Friends
For the following set of analyses, the same seven-way
ANOVA was conducted except that the pleasant/unpleasant
variable indicated whether the sender was attempting to display pleasant or unpleasant reactions to the film rather than
whether the films themselves were pleasant or unpleasant.
Among friends only, ratings of expressivity appear to be an
indirect measure of whether the sender was showing genuine or
fake pleasant and unpleasant emotions. Among friends, pleasant displays of emotion were rated as more expressive when
they were genuine than when they were faked, and unpleasant
displays of emotion were rated as less expressive when they
were genuine than when they were faked. Essentially, judges
view any attempt at sending pleasantness as more expressive
than any attempt at sending unpleasantness—but judges still
rate genuine pleasantness as more expressive—and genuine
unpleasantness as less expressive—than the faked attempts at
these emotions. This pattern was found among friends but not
strangers, F(1, 41) = 59.81, p < .001, η2 = .59. Figure 2 displays
these results on a spectrum from genuine pleasantness to genuine unpleasantness. While perceived expressivity appears to be
an indirect cue to deception among friends, perceived intensity
was not found to be a significant indirect cue.

Discussion
This study tested whether people are more accurate detecting
the deception and genuine emotion of their friends than

strangers over the course of early friendship development.
More specifically, this longitudinal study was designed to
determine which person in the close friendship is responsible
for the improved accuracy over time—the judge or the
sender. In addition, data were collected to explore whether
there might be evidence of both motivated inaccuracy
between friends and indirect deception detection.

Friends Were More Accurate Than Strangers
(Research Question 1)
In general, judges were more accurate detecting deception
and guessing emotions of their friends than of strangers.
These findings were consistent regardless of whether the
judges made their decisions based on dichotomous choices
or continuous ratings and, for most of the dependent variables, regardless of whether the senders were being truthful
or deceptive.

The Advantage in Judging Friends More
Accurately Than Strangers Increases Over Time
in Close Friendships (Research Question 2)
Close friends became more accurate judging their friends at
Time 2 than they had originally been at Time 1. This improvement over time was marginally significant for deception
detection and statistically significant for emotion detection.
Less close friends showed no changes in accuracy over time,
and people also did not become more accurate judging the
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judging their close friends at Time 2 and a relative lack of
self-efficacy judging strangers in comparison. Consistent
with past research on self-efficacy (Bandura & Wood, 1989),
if these close friends assumed that they would do better judging their friends than strangers at Time 2, the relative lack of
self-efficacy for judging strangers could have led to a selffulfilling prophecy in which they did not try as hard to detect
the deception of strangers. Or similarly, feelings of self-efficacy may have caused judges to feel more anxiety during the
task and they may have done poorly because they focused
more intently on unhelpful cues. These explanations are only
speculative, as ratings of self-efficacy were not collected.
Furthermore, because this pattern of results was unpredicted
and only occurred for deception detection but not emotion
detection, it is important to replicate this pattern in future
research.
Figure 2. Expressivity ratings of friends and strangers arranged
on a spectrum from genuinely pleasant to genuinely unpleasant
displays of emotion.

same stranger over time. This is a conceptual replication of
the key finding of the study by Anderson et al. (2002) that
close friends became more accurate over time but less close
friends did not.
In past studies in which judges have had to guess whether
a life story told by the sender is true or false (e.g., Anderson
et al., 2002), the expected advantage that close friends have
could be attributed to the fact that people have more knowledge about their close friend’s life and therefore more information upon which to evaluate those life stories. However, in
the current study, the senders merely conveyed nonverbal
expressions of emotion in reaction to film clips which would
give no special advantage to close friends based on their
knowledge of each other’s lives. Therefore, the advantage in
judging close friends more accurately than less close friends
or strangers does not rely upon having specific factual
knowledge about the sender’s life.
Interestingly, accuracy at detecting the deception of
strangers decreased from Time 1 to Time 2 but only for close
friends. When these close friendships were fairly new at
Time 1, the judges were almost as accurate judging strangers
as they were judging their close friends (only 6% difference).
Five months later at Time 2, close friends became more accurate detecting the deception of their friends, and also less
accurate detecting the deception of strangers, making the
advantage in judging friends more accurately than strangers
a 28% difference. Because this pattern only occurred among
close friends, it may be due to an assumption that close
friends should be able to read each other easily after being
friends for many months. People intuitively believe that their
friends can detect their lies more accurately than acquaintances (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), and as people become
closer, they become more confident in detecting each other’s
lies (Levine & McCornack, 1992). It is possible that close
friends in particular experienced high self-efficacy when

Improvement in the Accuracy of Close Friends
Over Time Is Due to the Sender in Close
Friendships (Research Question 3)
One important question not addressed by the design of the
study by Anderson et al. (2002) is whether the development of
close friends’ superior deception detection ability is due to
changes over time in judges’ perceptive abilities regarding their
close friends or to changes over time in senders’ expressive
behavior within close friendships. We suspect that most people
would intuit that both our findings and the findings of Anderson
et al. are due largely to judges’ improvement at decoding their
close friends’ nonverbal cues over time. However, as personality researchers have discussed at length (e.g., Funder, 2012;
Human & Biesanz, 2011), interpersonal accuracy depends not
only on judges’ detection ability but also on senders’ ability to
communicate interpersonal phenomena effectively. The inclusion of the Re-do condition in our study provides an effective
way to tease apart improvements in judges’ detection ability
from changes in senders’ communication.
If judges in close friendships become more skilled over
time at detecting their close friends’ deceptions and true
emotions, these judges should be more accurate in the Re-do
condition than the “Time 1” condition because in the Re-do
condition they are viewing the same Time 1 clips (in a different order) but with the advantage of having 5 more months of
close friendship. However, our data found that accuracy in
the Time 1 and Re-do conditions was nearly identical indicating that judges had no special advantage when they rerated
the Time 1 clips 5 months later in their relationship.
On the contrary, if judges in close friendships are more
accurate due to some change in their friends’ behavior over
time, then these judges should be more accurate in the “Time
2” condition than the Re-do condition because the Time 2 condition shows their close friend conveying emotions 6 months
into the friendship, while the Re-do condition shows their
close friend only 1 month into the friendship. Surprisingly, our
findings largely support this less intuitive theory, namely, that
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senders’ communicative behaviors (rather than the judges’
detection skills) change over time in a way that improves
accuracy within a close friendship. At the second testing session, close friends were more accurate at detecting deception
and guessing emotion when they viewed the nonverbal behaviors of their friend conveyed 6 months into the friendship than
when they viewed the previous nonverbal behaviors of their
friend conveyed 5 months earlier. In sum, judges’ accuracy in
detecting their close friends’ deception improves over time,
but this improvement appears to be due to some change in the
way their close friends express themselves, rather than an
improvement in their own decoding ability.
Although it is not clear exactly how the close friends are
acting differently 6 months into the friendship in a way that
enables their friends to judge their emotions more accurately,
it must include subtle nonverbal behaviors which strangers
and less close friends cannot pick up on. A potential explanation is that the nonverbal behaviors of the senders become
more subtle and idiosyncratic later in the friendship, and this
subtlety makes it more difficult for strangers and less close
friends to distinguish between the genuine and faked displays of emotions, whereas the close friends can. In support
of this explanation, the data indicate that judges perceived
senders as less expressive at Time 2 than at Time 1. It is possible that senders were perceived as more expressive at Time
1 because they utilized general display rules of emotion or
exaggerated their expressions. This could have increased
accuracy detecting deception if genuine but exaggerated
expressions were seen as more real (e.g., Duchenne-like
smiles), while the deceptive exaggerated expressions may
have appeared more forced and disingenuous. The fact that
senders became less expressive at Time 2 may be an indication that they used more idiosyncratic, subtle expressions at
Time 2 possibly because they were more familiar and comfortable with the task. Perhaps close friends at Time 2
guessed that an expression was genuine because it looked
more natural and idiosyncratic, in contrast to which the faked
emotions might have looked awkward and uncharacteristic
of their friend. The differences between these less expressive
displays of genuine and faked emotion at Time 2 must have
been quite subtle, however, because only close friends were
able to distinguish between the two, while less close friends
and strangers were not.
According to self-report data from the senders in a different study (Fleming et al., 1990), senders intentionally use
characteristic facial expressions that are more likely to be
recognized by their friends. However, in our study, close
friends were more accurate at Time 2 regardless of whether
the senders were intentionally sending to their friend or to a
stranger, and regardless of whether the senders were attempting to convey or fake their emotions. Therefore, whatever
nonverbal cues the senders emitted were unlikely to be conscious in this case. Although it may seem surprising that
close friends were just as accurate at Time 2 if their friend
was sending to them or to a stranger, strangers did in fact

perceive a significant difference in expressivity depending
upon whom the intended audience was. In both sessions of
the study, strangers found senders more expressive if the
sender was sending to a friend than to a stranger. In contrast,
participants found their friends to be equally expressive
regardless of their intended audience, perhaps because they
were more familiar with their friends’ idiosyncratic expressions and could recognize them even if they were more subtle. The surprising finding that the accuracy of friends was
unaffected by whether the senders were sending to them or to
strangers may have occurred precisely because friends did
not notice any differences in expressivity depending upon
the intended audience. Although less close friends also failed
to notice the differences in expressivity, only close friends
were able to distinguish between those less expressive genuine and faked emotions at Time 2.

Friends Were Not More Accurate Than Strangers
in Detecting Disguised Unpleasant Emotions
(Research Question 4)
The most dramatic decrease in the accuracy advantage for
friendship occurred when friends attempted to deceive
judges about their unpleasant emotions by feigning pleasant
emotions. This was the only condition in which friends were
even less accurate than strangers (although not significantly
so). These results support past findings of motivated inaccuracy among close friends (Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004).
When friends attempt to disguise their unpleasant emotions,
they may do so to protect their friendship. For example,
friends may disguise interpersonal feelings of envy, anger, or
sadness if they feel socially excluded to maintain positive
feelings within the friendship. Therefore, it may be in the
best interest of our friendships to take our friends’ faked positive emotions at face value.
However, given the stimuli used in this study, it is unlikely
that friends’ diminished accuracy detecting disguised
unpleasant emotion was due to any real threat to the friendship. The judges knew that the senders’ facial expressions
were in response to film clips which were irrelevant to their
friendship. Our study is not the first to find that friends are
inaccurate detecting hidden unpleasant emotions even when
those emotions pose no threat to the friendship (see
Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004). One possible explanation is
that friends fail to detect disguised unpleasant emotions
regardless of whether they are harmful to the relationship
due to an overgeneralization of a process that is adaptive in
situations where the recognition of concealed negative emotions has negative consequences. Another possible explanation is that inaccuracy is not self-motivated but is instead a
result of being polite and respecting someone’s emotional
privacy when they wish to keep their negative emotions hidden (DePaulo, Wetzel, Sternglanz, & Walker Wilson, 2003;
Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). While the expression of
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genuine unpleasant emotion may be a call to action which
friends need to recognize and be responsive to (Clark,
Fitness, & Brissette, 2000), when friends disguise their negative emotions, it may be because they do not wish to be
helped. When people fail to detect their friends’ disguised
unpleasant emotions, they may, in effect, make a challenging
situation go more smoothly by allowing their friends to deal
with their emotions privately. Surprisingly, in our study and
another study (Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004), friends’ inaccuracy detecting disguised or concealed unpleasant emotion
occurred even when the senders were not sending to their
friends. Thus, it may be that when people put on a happy face
to conceal their negative emotions from their friends or from
strangers, their friends unconsciously respect the sender’s
desire for emotional privacy by failing to detect the hidden
unpleasant emotion.
It is important for a friendship, however, that friends
detect genuine displays of unpleasant emotion which may be
expressed for the purpose of receiving support, empathy, or
help without having to ask (Clark et al., 2000). Not surprisingly, the advantage in guessing the emotions of friends more
accurately than strangers was largest in our study when senders conveyed truthful unpleasant emotions (76% accuracy).
It may be especially important to correctly identify friends’
intentionally conveyed unpleasant emotions so that we can
be responsive to their needs. In a study of helping behavior
between partners, people were particularly responsive to
their partner’s nonverbal need cues if their partner had just
provided them an appropriate form of help (DePaulo,
Brittingham, & Kaiser, 1983). The reciprocal helping that is
common in friendships may improve people’s ability to
detect their friends’ genuine unpleasant emotions and recognize when their friends are in need of help.

Expressivity Is an Indirect Deception Detection
Cue for Friends Only (Research Question 5)
Judges in our study perceived their friends as more expressive when their friends attempted to express pleasantness
than when they attempted to express unpleasantness.
However, their friends always appeared more expressive
when they had actually viewed a pleasant clip than when
they were pretending to have viewed a pleasant clip. In other
words, truthfully shown pleasantness appears more expressive than an attempt at faked pleasantness; likewise, truthfully shown unpleasantness appears less expressive than an
attempt at faking unpleasantness. In sum, judges see any
attempt at sending pleasantness as more expressive than any
attempt at sending unpleasantness, but judges still rate senders’ genuine pleasantness as more expressive—and senders’
genuine unpleasantness as more unexpressive—than the
“faked” attempts at either of these emotions. Thus, the degree
of perceived expressivity is an indirect cue of deceptive emotional displays, and this pattern was only found between

friends. Ratings of expressivity for strangers remained fairly
consistent regardless of what type of emotion they were
attempting to express truthfully or deceptively.
Expressivity may be an indirect cue to deception between
friends. It is possible that this is due to a lack of awareness
among senders that they tend to be more expressive when
experiencing pleasant than unpleasant emotion. If they are
unaware of that pattern, then their faked pleasant and unpleasant emotions may not be as different from each other in terms
of expressivity as their genuine pleasant and unpleasant emotions, as our results indicated. This would make their faked
pleasant emotions not quite expressive enough and their faked
unpleasant emotions too expressive. These differences in
expressivity may be too subtle to recognize in strangers but
friends may notice the differences because they have experience witnessing their friend’s range of expressivity.
The pattern found in our study, that senders were more
expressive when attempting to convey pleasant emotions
than unpleasant emotions, may be due to the particular emotions elicited by the video clips which the senders were reacting to. Among the six basic emotions, happiness, anger, and
disgust are the easiest to recognize (Wagner, MacDonald, &
Manstead, 1986). If the unpleasant clips in our study had
evoked anger or disgust as opposed to sadness, then perhaps
judges would have perceived those unpleasant displays of
emotion as equally expressive as the responses to the happy/
humorous clips. Although our study found that perceived
expressivity was an indirect cue to deception, future research
should test this using a broader array of emotions.

Potential Alternative Explanations and
Methodological Issues
In this study, both the senders and judges watched the same
film clips before the judges guessed whether the senders’
reactions were genuine or faked. Because the judges were
familiar with the stimuli that the senders were responding to,
the types of judgments made in this study were similar to
judgments commonly made in everyday life. Friends or
strangers may be in the same place, experiencing the same
set of events, and be unsure how the other person feels about
what just occurred. In this type of interpersonal perception
task, the judge is aware of the context and thus knows what
the possible range of emotions might be.
While this methodological choice may have increased
external validity, it also allows for a potential alternative
explanation of the results. Because the judges in this study
had also watched the pleasant and unpleasant film clips, the
possibility that the judges’ accuracy was influenced by their
familiarity with the stimuli needs to be addressed. While the
judges were aware that half of the film clips were pleasant
and half were unpleasant, they were not told that the senders
would be showing their genuine emotion exactly half of the
time and their faked emotion exactly half of the time. Because
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the judges did not know how many genuine or faked emotions they would observe, it is unlikely that they would have
been able to improve their accuracy by using process of
elimination on the last few video clips. Given how difficult it
is to detect deception according to meta-analytic estimates of
only 54% (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), and how difficult it was
to detect deception in this study (the overall accuracy rate
was 55%), judges would have to be improbably accurate for
process of elimination to significantly improve their accuracy. For example, a judge would have to guess correctly on
the first six facial expressions to have a distinct advantage in
figuring out the last two facial expressions. Nonetheless, if it
were possible to improve accuracy by using process of elimination on the later clips, the fact that the order of all of the
conditions was counterbalanced means that any advantage
judges might have had would have affected all conditions of
the study equally, rather than causing a confound.
Another alternative explanation is the possibility that the
accuracy rates for close friends at Time 1 and the Re-do condition were so similar because the judges consciously or unconsciously wanted to remain consistent with their earlier
judgments about their friends’ facial expressions. While this
explanation is possible, it seems unlikely for two reasons. First
of all, the judges may not have remembered how they rated the
eight clips of their friends 5 months earlier. Most importantly
though, even if they had remembered their earlier ratings, it
would have been difficult to make their second set of ratings
consistent with their first set of ratings given that the facial
expressions were shown in a different order in the Re-do condition than they had been shown originally at Time 1.
People can deceive each other using different methods
and it is possible that the results of this study would have
been different if different methods had been used. In our
study, senders were instructed to show the opposite emotion
than the one they were feeling and this instruction was meant
to represent a common form of deception in everyday life.
People who do not want their friends or strangers to know
their true (sad or angry) emotions might “put on a happy
face” (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996).
People may also sometimes fake negative emotions to seem
empathic or to gain attention (DePaulo, 2004). An alternative
methodological option is to instruct senders simply to conceal their true emotion, which might lead to a neutral, blank,
or stone-faced expression. Given that a blank expression
might be highly suspicious in certain social situations, we
suspect that people are more likely to display false emotions
than to appear utterly expressionless when trying to hide
their true emotions. However, the issue of whether alternative methods of disguising one’s emotions might affect
detectability is an empirical question, one that we hope will
be addressed in future research.

Conclusions and Future Directions
Our study extended earlier research by Anderson et al. (2002)
about the development of emotional deception detection

accuracy in friendships over time in three important ways.
First of all, by incorporating the Re-do condition, our study
was able to show that improvement in the accuracy of close
friends over time is due to some change in the senders within
close friendships rather than the judges. What exactly the
senders in close friendships are doing differently later into
the friendship is still unknown and is an important question
for future research. However, based on our data, we suspect
it is related to the senders becoming less expressive later in
the friendship in a way that gives only their close friends an
advantage in detecting their deception and true emotions.
Second, the judges in our study had to detect nonverbal
forms of deception, whereas the judges in the study by
Anderson et al. (2002) made judgments about truthful and
fabricated life stories. An alternative explanation of their
results is that the close friends were more accurate because
they had more information about their friends’ lives and
could interpret the plausibility of their stories more knowledgeably. However, in our study, information about friends’
lives could not have been responsible for the improved accuracy because judgments were based on facial expressions
alone. Therefore, friends are more accurate than strangers
even when the advantage of knowing more about the lives of
friends than strangers is irrelevant.
Finally, our study is the first to find an indirect cue to
deception that is unique to friendships: perceptions of expressivity. Future research could explore whether there are other
indirect cues to deception within the context of friendships or
romantic relationships.
Although our study found that friends lost their accuracy
advantage over strangers when their friends were trying to
disguise unpleasant reactions to film clips, we suspect that
motivated inaccuracy within friendships would be even
greater if those unpleasant emotions were threatening to the
friendship. Motivated inaccuracy is especially likely to occur
when there is a real motivation and benefit to that inaccuracy
(Anderson et al., 1999). Future research could look specifically at altruistic and relationship-maintaining lies longitudinally. As a friendship develops over time, particularly a close
friendship in which personal secrets are shared and friends
depend on each other, the importance of maintaining that
friendship may increase. Therefore, it is possible that accuracy for altruistic and relationship-maintaining lies will
decrease over time as those lies become even more important
to believe.
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Note
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(1967), and Winer (1971) for the use of ANOVA with dichotomous dependent variables.
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